Fujitsu Cup (**-****)

As the cherry blossoms displayed their full glory in central Tokyo last Saturday, 16 players sat down in the first round of the 13th World Go Championship, the Fujitsu Cup. China, South Korea and Japan were represented by four players each, while one each came from North America, South America, Taiwan and Europe. I had the honor of representing Europe.

Unfortunately, none of the representatives of the latter four regions survived this round. The gap between the three major go playing countries-China, South Korea and Japan-and other areas remains large. In the second round two days later, the winners of the first round played eight seeded players consisting of four Japanese, two Chinese, and two South Korean representatives.

There were a number of surprising results. Lee Chang Ho, who established his reputation internationally by winning a major tournament at the age of 16 and was regarded as the strongest player in the world, lost to Chinese 8-dan Zhou Heyang, while Rui Naiwei, the strongest female in the world and the only woman playing in the tournament, lost to Satoru Kobayashi after beating former 10-dan Naoto Hirosaka in the first round. Favorite Cho Chikun, born in South Korea but representing Japan, was seeded but he lost to Cho Hoon Hyun of South Korea.

What was especially interesting was that in six cases, representatives of a particular country were not born in that country. The most remarkable case is that of Rui, who was born in China, studied in Japan for a few years then emigrated to the United States. She finally settled in South Korea, which she represented in this tournament. As Jimmy Cha, who was born in South Korea and was representing North America, remarked: "Go players are like a large family."

The quarterfinals will take place in South Korea on June 2.

Misguided conceptions

Diagram 1: This is the game I played with Chang Hsu, a Taiwan-born 6-dan pro who is only 20 years old. He had beaten eight other professionals to qualify as a representative of Japan. In the second game he defeated former world champion Ma Xiaochun from China.

I was black and we were allowed three hours of playing time each and 5-1/2 points komi. The joseki (standard corner exchange) that follows is not a favorite of mine as Black does not benefit much and White's thickness is without flaws. This means that in the future Black will have more territory but may become prey for White, the hunter.

Reference 1: I had hoped for the result shown here as Black would profit more and achieve some influence on the outside as well. If the development in the lower left corner pans out like this, Black can play A later if he needs to live inside White's territory. Alternatively, he can reduce White's framework by playing at B or profit by playing C in sente (White has to answer to prevent Black from connecting his two stones 1 and 11 to C on the first line).

Diagram 2: White 24 is an interesting move, but White must be careful in choosing the joseki as in Reference 2. A player should not blindly follow a joseki. Look first at the situation as a whole and see if the tactics or local strategies follow a unified idea and that the stones are working together.

Reference 2: Black 5 is perfect to cancel out White's thickness on the left. This would definitely be unsatisfactory for White.

In Diagram 2, Black profits fairly well in the lower right corner and maintains sente too. Black 33 makes miai of 37 and expanding his corner by playing above 34.

Black 35 is played to make sure that White cannot play here in sente.

Black 37 cancels out the white influence on the lower part of the board while strengthening the upper right corner.

Black 39 could have been one space to the left but that would leave a cut behind. I was afraid that sometime during the game I had to use an extra move to defend this weakness. The principle is that one should play cautiously in the opponent's sphere of influence and fiercely when you are in a position to attack.

Black 41 could have been at 51 or one space to the left of 51 to build up a moyo. Locally, black 41 is a timely move and provides a strong position in this corner.

White 50 is the only move at this point-if Black gets the fourth corner too by playing at 51, White will lose the game.

After the sequence to 58, Black plays a good move at 59, which could have been one space to the left. This move expands Black's influence while keeping White's moyo below in check.

Reference 3: Instead of 59, Black could have played at 3 and 5 after first exchanging 1 for 2. This was what I first had in mind. A black stone at 3 threatens to cut at C. However, the cut does not work.

In Diagram 2, White profits from 64, 66 and 68. Black 69, however, was a mistake. This move did not lose the game but with his next move White changed the flow of the game.

Problem 1: Looking at Diagram 2, can you guess which move White made to reverse the flow of the game? And can you find a better move than black 69 ?

Problem 2: Black 1 does not work because White can capture this stone. How does White do this ? Hint: Use sente (moves that have to be answered) against Black's corner.

Answers to last week's problems

Solution 1: When Black played at 1, White immediately responded with the sequence up to 6, which is good but loses the initiative. Therefore, White should have exchanged 2 for 3 and then played 4 and 6. Black's attack at 7 is easily parried with 8. The beauty of having stones at 2 and 6 is that White can later play at B to accumulate strength or start a ko by going all out with A, black B and white C. As Black has to run away with D after white 8, White has plenty of ko threats.

Solution 2: After black 1, White should have answered at 2. If we assume the same moves as in the game, Black now plays 3 and White captures with 4 and 6. After this capture, it becomes apparent that if White plays at A later and Black defends with B, White does not need to use a move at C. By not doing so, White gets to play at 8, which seals Black in and keeps the initiative.